Indo Pakistan Relationship Essay Titles


The divide and rule policy of the British resulted in the partition of the country into India and Pakistan in 1947. Relations between the two countries have remained strained ever since. The ceasefire Agreement that was reached through the mediation of the United Nations established the ceasefire line. In 1965 and later in 1971, Pakistan attacked India but on both the occasions, it was defeated. The territorial gains made in these wars were aborted for empty promises of establishing peace and tranquility in the region, at the Tashkand Summit and by the Shimla Agreement. The Shimla Agreement bound the two countries not to resort to force for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute and termed the ceasefire line as the Line of control (LOG) distrust between the two countries persisted because Pakistan continued to amass weapons of mass destruction and nuclear warheads in its arsenal. Simultaneously, it sent armed militants to Punjab and Kashmir for abetting violence and has also remained a subject of dispute between the two countries. Talks over a “no-war-act” were put across to Pakistan by Pt. Nehru in 1948 and pursued by successive Prime Ministers which till date have yielded no result. The two countries gained the reputation of being nuclear power, which has further aggravated the situation in the sub-continent. The bus diplomacy, undertaken by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, proved a failure because military skirmishes in the Siachen region and in some parts along the LOG increased. A big blow was received by India when Pakistan sent armed infiltrators across the LOG in Kargil, while the country was basking in the glory of the supposedly successful peace talks. Our Prime Ministers from Pt. Nehru to Mr. Vajpayee lacked foresight  and remained gullible they trusted the double stand of Pakistan, which declared its good intentions towards resolving the issue and simultaneously waged clandestine wars. Kargil has exposed the short sightedness and a lack of strategic vision of India towards its Defence.

There was much hype and hoopla as also great expectations to resolve the decades old Indo-Pak impasse when, on the initiative of India’s Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Gen. Pervez Musharraf landed in India in July 2000. Against the backdrop of the eternal dream in marble, the Taj Mahal in Agra, millions in India, Pakistan and many parts of the World sat glued to their TV sets for two days running to see a sensational  drama rising to high expectations and then all on a sudden, the plot taking a twist and ending in a tragic anticlimax, as the leaders of the subcontinent, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf, failed to set a date with destiny. Everyone knows that the imbroglio of Kashmir which has bedeviled the relations between India and Pakistan right from Independence which has brought about an unbridgeable divide between the two countries and which has triggered at least tour wars and a more lethal proxy war, cannot be solved with a slight of hand but the leaders assembled in Agra, the media persons and political analysts covering the great event, minute by minute, and the billions who looked forward to a break-through at last hoped that like the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore declaration, an Agra declaration would be forthcoming laying down cardinal guidelines of mutual cooperation on all outstanding issues including Kashmir that neither a job it declaration nor a joint statement could be issued after several hours of meeting between the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India and the ceaseless meetings between the Indian ministers and secretaries and their counterparts in Pakistan all through July 15 and 16, 2001 showed the abysmal differences in perception on various Indo-Pak contentious issues including Kashmir between New Delhi and Islamabad.

Kashmir! Kashmir! Kashmir! An obsession that Pakistan and Pakistani leaders be they the civilian leaders or the four military dictators including the fourth military dictator-turned president Pervez Musharraf can hardly get over even after 54 years during which the world has changed a lot for the better. There is an expanding constituency of enlightened opinion across the subcontiental divide that would like India and Pakistan to enter the vast untraded territory of opening up the great frontiers of economic , cooperation, trade and commerce, promoting greater social and cultural interaction and getting to grips with a host of other problems that have a bearing on the Present and future of the people of both the countries. Individually and collectively, the people of both the countries cherish a sincere desire to come together on all fronts since they have a common heritage, History and geography which the gory nightmare of partition has not been able to erase and which religious bigotry has not been able to submerge. Some public opinion at different levels in both the countries shares the optimism that together Pakistan and India, if they give up obsession over Kashmir have  would to win and can march on a high road to prosperity and progress.

It is this wider concern to address a vast spectrum of the totality of issues or Possibilities that made Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee announce a serf of Confidence Building Measures (CBM) ahead of the Agra Summit  measures that could bring, the people of Pakistan and India and the people of Pakistan occupied Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir together. India was keen to break the moth-eaten mindset of the total preoccupation with Kashmir and open fresh avenues of friendship that could build up trust between people and leaders which was why we had in Agra senior ministers like, Mr. Yashwant Sinha (Finance) and Mr. Murasoli Maran (Commerce & Industry) apart from the Prime Minister, the Home Minister Mr. L. K. Advani and the External Affairs and Defence Minister Mr. Jaswant Singh, India knew that Pakistani leadership’s overplaying of the Kashmir issue has made both the countries drift from each other to such an extent that a spark is enough to ignite a nuclear holocaust by intent or accident, a great optimist Mr. Vajpayee refused to mull over a dosed door but was prepared to see the hundreds of doors that are open and that can bring the people together.

With all the hype and the swirling rumours from New Delhi and Agra on July 14 and 15,2001 that the talks were moving on a positive course, things were just the contrary that both India and Pakistan were in fact, moving on parallel lines. While India was for a composite dialogue, well geared to get to grips with all the outstanding problems, the nuclear issues, the demilitarization of Siachen, no war declaration, exchange of prisoners of war, economic cooperation, relaxation of travel restrictions, curbing trans border terrorism, a vast range of other confidence building measures and of course, Kashmir, Pakistan had only one and only one topic on its agenda—Kashmir. Accordingly, both the president the small delegation and the media persons from Pakistan had come to India well prepared to discuss Kashmir and nothing else. In fact, the various pre-summit meetings the President took with different shades of opinion in Pakistan and the different speeches he made and interviews he gave to newspapers indicated that Pakistani leadership was seized of this monomania.

On the eve of his crucial summit, in an interview with Gulf News. President Musharraf rejected both the Shimla Agreement and the Lahore declaration between India and Pakistan saying the two accords does not address the main issue of Kashmir. He also said that any move to convert the present line of control (LOG) between India and Pakistan into an international border would not be acceptable to Islamabad and Pakistan’s fourth military ruler was in no mood to make an idea of concessions on the rigid stand of the basic form of dialogue that he would have with India. At the Editors conference in Agra on July 16,2001 he ridiculed Vajpayee’s CBMS and harped on his familiar theme of Kashmir, treating it as the most important among the CBMS. He totally ignored India’s plea made during his meetings with Mr. L.K. Advani in New Delhi on July 14, 2001 and the eight-hour long meetings with the Prime Minister of India in Agra on two successive days for stopping the movement of terrorists from Pakistan side. Mr. Musharraf was never tired of saying that he had come to India with an ‘open mind’, in effect, it was ‘open’ only to Kashmir but dosed to all other bilateral issues including the genesis of the Kashmir problem and the continuing bloodbath it has triggered. The invasion of Kashmir by Pakistani troops in 1947 and the proxy war that began in 1989 that has killed more people than all the four Indo-Pak wars put together to presume that India would hand over Kashmir on a platter to Pakistan just because the majority of the people of Kashmir are Muslims or that India would be browbeaten into submission by the unbridled militant activity, fully supported by Pakistan, is a bitter reality Pakistan must learn to recognize. Ahead of the Agra Summit, bath the Prime Minister and the foreign minister had made it clear that Kashmir was an integral part of India it was also the unanimous view of the all party meeting held by the Prime Minister that they should get out of the “narrow approached” of the past and tackle the totality of the bilateral relations trade and commerce easier communications and travel between the people of the two countries, the problem of cross border terrorism and the nuclear question.

That India had a liberal approach to break the thaw must be widely recognized and the magnanimity and the great statesmanship of Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee must be recognized, a fact acknowledged by no less a person than Pervez Musharraf, die architect of the Kargil war Mr. Vajpayee knows that when he was shaking hands with the Prime Minister Mr. Nawaz Sharif in Lahore early in 1999, the military was preparing for the conflict in Kargil. Despite Kargil, the betrayal of the Lahore declaration and the killings of the innocents and the security personnel in the valley by mercenaries exported by Pakistan are acknowledged as the hub o{ international terrorism even by USA. Mr. Vajpayee invited and talked to a leader of Pakistan who is still responsible for the bloodbath in the valley and who like other leaders of Pakistan, was unwilling to look beyond Kashmir at the total landscape of bilateral relations.

Like the Prime Minister of India, the President of India Mr. K. R. Narayanan, spoke from the core of his heart at the banquet he hosted in honour o the visiting president Gen. Musharraf on July 14,2001 said the president ‘Tomorrow, when you and the Prime Minister of India sit together in Agra for your dialogue, I hope, the face of the poorest person in this subcontinent will be before you and you will ponder together how this impoverished common man will be benefited by your deliberations and decisions. If this is held before you, I believe that all other issues between us will play into secondary importance and will become amenable to amicable and satisfactory solutions.”

The president also said that the two countries can also immensely benefit it they pooled together their significant achievements in the fields of science to economic development. In fact, the President mirrored the hopes and aspirations of the entire people of the subcontinent trapped in the quagmire of mistrust, hatred and a no win situation where both the governments are compelled to earmork a sizeable chunk of their budget for weaponry that could have gone for the development of the people for that to live in peace and mutual trust is essential. It was this ethos of the larger good of the people of the subcontinent that prompted India to present a comprehensive agenda at the Summit of Agra.

From the high pinnacle of hope of the previous two days, the talks at the summit took a downhill path on the last day when the blaze of excitement whimpered to a pervading gloom as the fundamental differences over Kashmir and trans-border terrorism led to a total breakdown of the talks. While India was prepared to go to some length to recognize Kashmir as the central issue, Pakistan was in no mood to acknowledge is support to cross border terrorism, which it described as a “freedom struggle”. And even on the last day of the summit, it was “business as usual” away in the Kashmir valley with 50 deaths reported in 24 hours, all triggered by militancy in a suicide attack, militants of the Pakistan based Lashkar-e-Ta iba stormed the Army Camp in Kupwara district killing five soldiers.

Images of the eventful past passed your mind’s eye one by one Gen. Ayub Khan and Lai Bahadur Shastri in Task end in 1965, India Gandhi and Zuifikar Ali Bhutto in Shimla in 1972 Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee and Mr. Nawaz Sharif in Lahore in 1999. The Task end spirit, the Shimla Agreement, the Lahore declaration and now the failed summit at Agra. Where do we go from here? The Prime minister, Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee has accepted the invitation of the Pakistani President to visit mat country before the end of the year. And in between, the two leaders might meet again at the UN in September and at the SAARC meeting. In what ways the fallout from Agra will influence the future of the bilateral relations remains to be seen. While the President of Pakistan has made it clear that there is no military solution to the Kashmir issue in the course of his speech at the banquet hosted by the Indian President on July 14, 2001. He is in no frame of mind to rein in the forces that infiltrate the border and wreak havoc day after day in Jammu and Kashmir and Mr. Vajpayee knows that rhetoric has to be treated as mere rhetoric and he warned in Agra on July 16,2001 that “no one should think that India does not have the resolve, strength or stamina to continue resisting terrorism and violence” Still, recently during two day visit in April 2003 to Kashmir: Vajpayee extended a hand of friendship towards Pakistan and to prove that he I sincere in improving the relationship with Pakistan. India announces t§| re-appointment of her High Commissioner in Islamabad. At the same time Vajpayee declared that the talks to be held with Pakistan would be decisive.

An Indian journalist, who has just been to Pakistan says: “Bureaucrats are convinced Musharraf will bring more focus to the Kashmir issue expend more energies on it man politicians Critics, though say the army won’t allow any settlement on Kashmir, for it is their bread and butter. Yet again, a Pakistani analyst says: “army has come to dominate the polity they’ve to justify this domination and its existence. How else can they do this but by having strained relations with India? Only resolving the Kashmir issue can do then.

On the credit side, we might say that talks between India and Pakistan at the highest level have begun, the Agra fiasco notwithstanding. It is possible there might be more talks at ministerial and official levels in both Islamabad and New Delhi in the months ahead there may be mini-summits. For the alternative to talks are frightening. Neither of them can afford a war. A solution to specifics is possible only when there is trust and that is what is woefully lacking. And there is a yawning hiatus between rhetoric and reality. We saw how the lofty declarations made in Lahore were torn up in the aftermath of the Kargil war. The policy of give and take is never more relevant than now. Trust begets trust and it is now Pakistan’s turn to demonstrate it in abundant measure after me Agra summit, now mat India has gone at great lengths to create the cordial atmosphere in the subcontinent by its acts of forgiveness and forgetting, Let no Pakistan get away with the false illusion that it can wrest Kashmir at the point of gun. “Nothing endurable can be achieved through violence”, said Napoleon Bonapart. And this axiom found an echo in the Musharraf’s words when he himself admitted that there is no military solution to Kashmir. Kashmir is only a symptom of the larger malaise of mistrust between the two nations. Dissolve this mistrust and a solution to the problem will follow in accordance with the wishes of all concerned.

The Biggest setback to India in Kashmir is USA’s over dependence on Pakistan for its current military operations is Afghanistan. Neither the USA nor Britain can afford to antagonize Gen. Pervez Musharraf at this: stage that is carrying on his proxy war in Kashmir despite posturing to fight terrorism in Afghanistan along with the USA.

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Brigadier (Retired) Naeem Ahmad Salik
FDI Associate


Key Points

  • There is a need to embrace an overarching strategic stability regime and to shun aggressive security doctrines to reduce the possibility of a nuclear conflict.
  • The problems of terrorism and Non-State Actors need to be addressed jointly through institutionalised mechanisms.
  • Water issues should be resolved through the mechanisms provided by the Indus Basin Treaty and should not be allowed to degenerate into a serious source of conflict.
  • Confidence-building measures should be pursued to alleviate the “trust deficit” but should not be used as a substitute for the resolution of disputes.
  • Economic co-operation and trade should be facilitated to develop mutuality of interest.
  • India and Pakistan need to understand each other’s legitimate interests in Afghanistan and pursue them without coming into conflict with each other.



In the last 65 years, India and Pakistan have been unable to resolve their differences and develop a normal good neighbourly relationship, which could have benefitted people on both sides of the border. There have been several attempts to initiate a sustainable peace process, but most were either stillborn or abandoned in their infancy. Does it mean that the two countries are condemned to live in perpetual hostility? Can they overcome their historic rivalry and emulate the example of France and Germany in the post-World War II era? Are the problems besetting their bilateral relations so intractable that no resolution is possible? Can they set aside their differences for a while and build on commonalities of interests?



These and many other such questions can be raised by any concerned observer of the South Asian region, where the disharmony between the two major players has adversely affected the ability of the region as a whole to attain its true potential, unlike, for instance, the advancements made in the ASEAN region. The continued conflict and tension in the relationship between the two countries, whose rivalry has a nuclear dimension as well, cannot be to anyone’s benefit. For the past decade or so, their differences have transcended their common borders and have also played out in Afghanistan. The biggest beneficiaries of this prolonged conflict have been the extremist elements in both countries and, more recently, the non-state actors (NSAs). The NSAs seemingly have the capability to disrupt and derail any effort towards resolving the outstanding issues between India and Pakistan at will, by perpetrating a violent incident. Major world powers have also promoted their geo-political interests by playing one country off against the other from time to time.

Causes of Conflict

The tensions between India and Pakistan are deeply rooted in their common history. Their failure to reconcile their differences ultimately resulted in the partition of the Sub-continent. The partition itself was the result of a legal and constitutional process approved by both the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Unfortunately, however, the actual partition was accompanied by mindless blood-letting and lasting acrimony resulting from complaints about the work of the Radcliffe Commission that was entrusted with the demarcation of the boundaries of the two states. The messy procedure adopted by the British for determining the fate of the Princely States, sowed the seeds of the continuing conflict over the predominantly Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir.

The festering Kashmir dispute has bedevilled relations between India and Pakistan. It has caused two wars (1948 and 1965), a serious border conflict (Kargil, 1999) and has brought immense suffering and hardship to the people of the state. This unresolved dispute has also been a major drain on the resources of the two countries and has been a stumbling block to normalising relations between them.

A problem closely related to that of Kashmir is the distribution of the water of the rivers flowing from there into Pakistan. Pakistan has a predominantly agrarian economy and, being a lower riparian state, has naturally been concerned about continuation of an adequate supply of irrigation water. The problem was thought to have been resolved in the early 1960s through the Indus Basin Treaty, mediated by the World Bank. But the problem is far from settled, as Pakistan has raised concerns over some of the Indian hydroelectric projects under construction on the western rivers that will affect waters for which Pakistan has the rights. The water problem has a serious potential to precipitate conflict in the future, given the rising requirements and shrinking supplies.

The Nuclear Dimension

Some commentators hoped in 1998 that the overt possession of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan would bring about the realisation that any conflict between them would have catastrophic consequences for both countries and would, therefore, result in strategic stability. Unfortunately, that expected peace dividend is yet to be attained. Instead, a steady nuclear weapon and missile competition continues, in the absence of an overarching restraint regime. India has been propounding and war-gaming its provocative “Cold Start” and “pro-active Operations” doctrines since 2004. Pakistan has responded by introducing battlefield nuclear weapons.


The conflict in Afghanistan has also had spill-over effects on Indo-Pakistani relations. The strategic partnership agreement between India and Afghanistan and the growing Indian presence in that country, have only added to Pakistan’s concerns that India is attempting to squeeze it from both the east and west. With uncertainties surrounding the internal dynamics of a post-NATO Afghanistan, it also could become an arena for India-Pakistan hostility to play out. That would have serious consequences, not only for the peace and stability of Afghanistan, but also for the region as a whole.

Role of Non-State Actors

The problem of Non-State Actors (NSAs) and their trans-frontier activities has been one of the most vexing issues between the two South Asian neighbours in recent years. In the past decade, it has brought the two countries to the verge of war in 2001-02 and again in 2008; it also derailed the Composite Dialogue process between them, which appeared to be regaining some traction after a hiatus of three years. Hopes were further raised by the election of Nawaz Sharif to the office of Prime Minister. Sharif has made no secret of his wish for peace and warmer relations between India and Pakistan, despite the fact that he has not received reciprocation from India. The recent eruption of violence across the Line of Control in Kashmir, which in normal times would be a routine affair, has been blown out of proportion by the Indian media and some political parties with an eye on the forthcoming national elections in India. Incidents such as the attack on the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi by political activists can only add to the acrimony. Such incidents have compounded the already acute trust deficit between the two countries. India has accused Pakistan of sponsoring “cross-border terrorism” against it and, after the recent cross-LOC incident, blamed the Pakistani Army for fomenting trouble. Pakistan complains that India has provided material support, through Afghanistan, to the insurgents in Baluchistan and parts of the Federally Administered Tribal areas in the north-west and is now unhappy that instead of a responding to peace overtures, India is ratcheting up the anti-Pakistan rhetoric. If the proposed meeting between the two Prime Ministers on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in New York in September takes place as planned, it will hopefully help in improving the atmospherics of India-Pakistan relations.

Areas of Common Interest   

Peace and stability are pre-requisites for economic development, trade and politico-socio-cultural relations. This has assumed added urgency since South Asia has obtained nuclear capability, as there is now little margin for error. It is imperative that the security situation in South Asia is stabilised and made as resistant as possible to the periodic shocks caused by the actions of NSAs. Avoidance of crises, prevention of conflicts and the building of mutual confidence should therefore be common objectives for the two countries. 

There is a huge potential for the expansion of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan, especially now that the long-standing issue of Pakistan granting Most Favoured Nation status to India seems closer than ever to being resolved. But other issues, such as non-tariff barriers to trade, will have to be addressed before any positive move can be made towards increasing trade. There is also a long list of items on the negative list which have to be looked at before significant improvement can be achieved. The promotion of official trade will discourage smuggling and other means of illegal trade that at present cost the two countries substantial lost revenue.

The serious energy shortages faced by both countries are hampering their economic development. India cannot maintain a healthy economic growth rate if its energy resources remain inadequate, as was made apparent by the total blackout of northern India in July 2012. In Pakistan, normal public life has been badly disrupted by chronic electricity outages for many years and the scarcity of energy has also adversely affected industrial output.

It would be in the interests of the two countries to forge co-operation in the field of energy. While India has effectively withdrawn from the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project, it still seems to be interested in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. TAPI depends largely on peace and stability in Afghanistan, which means that India and Pakistan should have a peaceful and stable Afghanistan as a common cause, rather than competing for influence there. In the much longer term, depending on the overall state of their relations, the two countries could possibly also collaborate in the field of nuclear energy.

How to Achieve the Desired Outcomes

The 1999 Lahore Memorandum of Understanding was the first Indo-Pakistani effort to come to grips with their mutual problems and to explore measures to reduce tensions in a nuclearised South Asia. Though the process was interrupted by the Kargil episode, the proposed confidence-building measures (CBMs) were taken up when the composite dialogue resumed in 2004, resulting in some significant bilateral agreements. It appears, however, that the list of CBMs agreed to at Lahore has been exhausted and currently there seems to be no discernible forward movement in the bilateral talks. It is important that negotiators think of new and innovative CBMs and establish an oversight and review mechanism to monitor the performance of past agreements, to give some impetus to the peace process. But CBMs can only be expected to provide temporary stability at best and, ultimately, the two countries’ outstanding political problems, including the Kashmir dispute, will need to be resolved.

The efforts at building confidence and trust and seeking resolution of disputes can only bear fruit if the process is sustained and remains uninterrupted. On many occasions in the recent past, certain groups and individuals opposed to reconciliation between India and Pakistan have succeeded in disrupting the peace efforts. The two countries will have to resist these disruptive forces by evolving institutional mechanisms to deal with them. Past efforts were half-hearted and depended to a large extent on the character and attitudes of the individuals representing the two countries in the Joint Counter-terrorism mechanism.

As the conflict in Afghanistan winds down, India and Pakistan will need to discuss their respective legitimate interests in that country. India will need to convince Pakistan that its interest in Afghanistan is not aimed at opening up a new front in the west or promote destabilisation in the two Pakistani provinces bordering Afghanistan. For its part, Pakistan will need to reassure India that it respects the legitimate and sovereign rights of India and Afghanistan to develop their bilateral relations. Due to its geographical position, Pakistan can either facilitate or block the trade between India and Afghanistan passing through its territory, but that will be entirely dependent on the state of India-Pakistan relations.

Regular exchanges between the people of the two countries can create better understanding and goodwill. It is sometimes amazing to find how little their people know about each other’s countries and their socio-cultural environments, despite the often-repeated claims of having lived side-by-side for a thousand years. Recent initiatives, such as the frequent discussions and exchanges of visits between parliamentarians and politicians from both the federal and regional parliaments, are moves in the right direction and need to be sustained. The agreement for a liberalised visa regime is also a positive development, if implemented in a positive spirit.

As mentioned earlier, neither trade, economic co-operation nor socio-cultural harmonies can yield any dividends in the absence of peace and stability. India and Pakistan, therefore, need to remove the causes of the tensions underpinning their relations. India will have to move away from offensive and provocative military doctrines and Pakistan, which has responded by lowering its nuclear threshold, would need to pull back to a more stable, and less crisis-prone, nuclear posture.

Role of the International Community      

The international community can continue to encourage and facilitate an uninterrupted peace dialogue between India and Pakistan. India has always been scornful of foreign mediation between them and prefers bilateral engagement, where it can bring its greater weight to bear. This continues despite the fact that the US involvement during the Kargil crisis went entirely in India’s favour. Pakistan, which has in the past sought external balancing and tried to invoke international mediation in its disputes with India, may well be wary of outside intervention after its Kargil experience. Nevertheless, friendly nudging by countries enjoying good relations with both India and Pakistan should be welcome.

On the other hand, however, Australia’s decision to sell uranium to India is seen in Pakistan as being detrimental to its national security interests; just as the US-India nuclear deal was viewed as discriminatory and harmful to its security. The recent ‘Australia in the Asian Century’ White Paper did not even mention Pakistan and would not have been well received there. These developments have, to a large extent, curtailed Australia’s ability to play the role of a facilitator in the India-Pakistan peace process. Its growing politico-economic relations with India, however, do place it in a position to encourage India to remain engaged in the composite dialogue with Pakistan.






About the Author: Brigadier (Retired) Naeem Ahmad Salik is a PhD candidate at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies in the Political Science and International Relations Department at the University of Western Australia. From February 2009 to March 2011, he taught at the Department of Strategic and Nuclear Studies, in the Faculty of Contemporary Studies at the National Defence University, Islamabad. He has been a Visiting Scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University and a Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, Washington DC, from January 2006 to March 2007. Before his retirement in October 2005, after a military career spanning 31 years, he served for more than five years as Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs at the Strategic Plans Division, in the Secretariat of Pakistan’s National Command Authority.







Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International.




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